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evaluations of merger decisions.  
 
Keywords: empirical methods of industrial organization, merger control, competi-
tion policy, antitrust decisions, comparative analysis 
 
JEL: C18, C54, L41, L40, K21 
  

# Prof. Dr. Oliver Budzinski, Professor of Economic Theory, Ilmenau University of Technology, Insti-
tute of Economics, Ehrenbergstraße 29, D-98693 Ilmenau, Email: oliver.budzinski@tu-
ilmenau.de. This paper represents an extended and modified version of my contribution to the 
OECD roundtable “Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions” (Paris, June 2011). I like to thank the 
participants of the OECD Roundtable, Arndt Christiansen and Knud Sinding for valuable com-
ments on earlier versions of this paper as well as Maryam Beigi, Nadine Neute and Janne Mord-
horst for valuable editorial assistance. 
2

Content: 
1. The Impact of Merger Control Decisions ............................................................... 3 
2. Methods of Ex Post Impact Evaluation .................................................................. 5 
2.1 Motivation, Incentives, and Categories of Impact Evaluation ......................... 5 
2.2 Structural Models and Simulations ............................................................... 10 
2.3 Difference-in-Differences ............................................................................... 12 
2.4 Event Studies ................................................................................................ 14 
2.5 Surveys .......................................................................................................... 18 
2.6 Expert Case Studies ....................................................................................... 20 
3. Comparing the Evaluation Methods .................................................................... 21 
4. Conclusion: A Note of Caution ............................................................................ 23 
References ............................................................................................................... 25 
 
 
  


3 

1. The Impact of Merger Control Decisions 
Competition is a self-organized, decentralized coordination process. It coordinates 
suppliers and customers on markets through price signals reflecting changing scar-
cities. Without requiring individual knowledge of overall allocation issues and with-
out requiring the individuals to target the balance of supply and demand, competi-
tion sets incentives for both market sides to adjust the individual supply and de-
mand plans according to the scarcity relations just by acting in a self-interested way 
(profit and utility maximization). Consequently, allocative efficiency is achieved 
through individual interaction in competition and without intervention or ex ante 
planning by any centralized authority (government, economic planning commis-
sion, etc.). Furthermore, competition provides incentives for producers and other 
suppliers to innovate. Only in competitive marketplaces, firms can benefit from be-
ing innovative by dragging customers away from competing firms and increasing 
their own market shares. At the same time, non-innovative firms must fear that 
more innovative competitors drag their customers away by providing innovative 
products or services better suited to the preferences of customers. This ‘double in-
centive’ supplements the intrinsic motivation to innovate because of engineering 
curiosity and, thus, considerably increases the incentives to innovate compared to 
non-competitive ‘market’places. Another incentive from competition, the incentive 
to imitate innovators, turns this innovation effect of competition into a permanent 
force. This entails the procompetitive effect of allowing only temporary competitive 
advantages through innovation, maintaining the incentive to further innovate for 
hitherto successful innovators. Next to the allocation effect (stationary efficiency) 
and the innovation effect (dynamic efficiency), competition keeps markets flexible 
and creates and maintains a high ability of markets to adapt to changing market 
environments. Firms (and customers) in competitive markets are trained to adjust 
their business behavior creatively and adaptively to each other (strategic interde-
pendency) and, thus, are better capable of coping with external shocks (changing 
market environment) than firms in non-competitive settings (evolutionary efficien-
cy). Through all three avenues, competition serves the normative goal of increasing 
economic welfare. 
In addition to these economic welfare-related competition effects, there is one 
more effect relating to societal goals. Competition is inevitably intertwined with 
economic freedom. Having competition among suppliers requires the freedom of 
choice on the side of the customers as well as the freedom to choose strategies 
(pricing, innovation, product design, service, industry, etc.) on the side of the en-
terprises. And, the other way around, economic freedom for enterprises and cus-
tomers automatically and inevitably creates competition. 
All these beneficial effects of competition are achieved in a decentralized and self-
organized way in the absence of centralized, political planning or organization in 
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the economy. However, the notion of free markets unleashing the beneficial forces 
of competition is also misleading to some extent. Competitive markets require an 
institutional framework in order to be sustainable and workable and this turns 
them into a social construction. Among the institutional preconditions for competi-
tive markets are property rights, commercial laws and many more. Furthermore, 
competition rules represent necessary institutions for the sustainable existence and 
functioning of competitive markets. Unfortunately, competition possesses an in-
herent tendency towards self-destruction. Instead of aiming to be better than its 
competitors, any enterprise can alternatively attempt to improve its market situa-
tion by eroding competition, for instance by colluding with its competitors (carteli-
zation), predating and deterring competitors (abuse of market power and unfair 
competition) or by merging with its competitors into one entity (mergers and ac-
quisitions). This incentive to circumvent and erode the forces of competition re-
quires competition rules and their enforcement through competition policy. There-
fore, the ‘impact’ of merger control decisions (as part of competition policy) should 
be to protect and maintain competition by preventing the occurrence of anticom-
petitive mergers. As such, merger control decisions should exercise a low degree of 
interventionism into markets by ‘just’ preventing anticompetitive combinations of 
enterprise ownership (negative intervention). In contrast, merger control decisions 
should not attempt to design or mould competitive market structures (positive, 
creative intervention).1 
Now, in an imperfect world, merger control decisions can be mistaken. Although 
the task at hand might look easy at first sight – procompetitive or anticompetitive, 
harm to competition or not – it is made rather complicated by the multidimension-
al character of competition (allocation, innovation, diversity, etc.). Competition can 
be harmed in many ways: price increases and output reduction, slowing down in-
novation, making markets more sclerotic, etc. From an economic theory perspec-
tive, it is impossible to discriminate between the different dimensions of competi-
tion regarding their importance for overall welfare. No single dimension of compe-
tition can scientifically be said to more important than another one. The fact that 
emphasis of analysis and policy is mostly put on prices and quantities (allocative 
efficiency) merely follows practical limitations regarding measurability and 
assessability of the other dimensions. In summary, the question when a merger has 
a negative impact on competition is far from being trivial! 
Consequently, merger control decisions can be wrong in two different ways: (i) 
merger control decisions may erroneously prohibit procompetitive mergers (type I 
errors), or (ii) merger control decisions may erroneously allow anticompetitive mer-
gers (type II errors). Both error types change the impact of merger control decisions 

1  Drawing the borderline between these two types of intervention may at times be difficult in 
practice, for instance, when it comes to conditional approvals of mergers. 


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(compared to error-free decisions). In case of type II errors, the merger control deci-
sion fails to protect competition on the market in question. In case of type I errors, 
the merger control decision represents an unnecessary intervention into competi-
tion and efficiency effects of procompetitive mergers may be discarded. 
 
2. Methods of Ex Post Impact Evaluation 
2.1 Motivation, Incentives, and Categories of Impact Evaluation 
Conducting ex post evaluation of merger control decisions obviously targets the 
‘correctness’ and accuracy of the decisions in question. Fundamentally, it can be 
distinguished between judicial reviews, targeting the legal accuracy of a decision, 
and economic reviews, targeting an assessment in terms of decision errors in re-
gard to welfare. While judicial reviews are typically institutionalized (appellation 
and revision courts) and effectively alter the (authority or first instance2) decision, 
economic reviews most often are not institutionalized and do not change the origi-
nal decision. Furthermore, economic reviews may focus on the agency decision 
alone or include the judicial review process, i.e. assessing the final subject-matter 
decision. This paper will focus on economic reviews of the final decision, i.e. includ-
ing alterations by judicial review procedures. Consequently, judicial reviews are not 
viewed to be an ex post impact evaluation but rather to be a part of the to-be-
evaluated decision (discussions provide Bergman 2008: 389-391; Budzinski 2012b: 
64-65). 
Furthermore, economic ex post evaluation of merger control decisions can be moti-
vated by three different purposes (see with somewhat differing denomination and 
systematics Don et al. 2008: 343 and Davies & Ormosi 2010: 4-6): 
I. Regime accountability: was the overall merger control regime worth the tax-
payers’ money?  This can be subdivided into (a) absolute regime accountabil-
ity, i.e. regime benefits exceeding regime costs (survey: Bergman 2008) and 
(b) comparative regime accountability, i.e. performance compared to other 
regimes (best practices; benchmarking). A regime may be beneficial in over-

2  Fundamentally, there are two stylized types of competition policy systems (Budzinski 2009: 372-
374). The administration system centers around a competition agency with investigation and de-
cision powers with courts acting as appellation and revision bodies. European competition policy 
may serve as a fitting example for this type. In the court system, on the other hand, competition 
agencies are limited to investigation power and must seek courtroom decisions for enforcement. 
Higher courts act as appellation and revision bodies. The U.S. antitrust system resembles im-
portant features of this type. Note that de facto the competition agency has some decision pow-
er in real-world court systems in merger control: clearance decisions can be done by the agency 
without asking the courts, whereas prohibition or remedy decisions require the approval of a 
court – or an amicable settlement.  
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all terms but create less net benefits than comparable regimes due to low ef-
ficiency. 
II. Agency accountability: did the agency investigate accurately and come to 
the correct decision given existing institutional and other constraints?3 
III. Merger control improvement: did the final decisions protect competition 
(minimize decision errors)?  
The three different motivations imply different corresponding evaluation goals and, 
consequently, different approaches towards the evaluation process. The first one, 
regime accountability, does not refer so much to an evaluation of specified single 
decisions. Instead, it focuses on the overall (aggregated) welfare effects of a given 
merger control regime. Thus, empirical methods that are suitable to identify the 
merger control impact on macroeconomic variables like growth and social welfare 
need to be employed. Sometimes, such studies are conducted with the aim to as-
sess whether the existence of a(ny) merger control regime is beneficial at all or if 
society would do better without one. For young regimes, such kind of impact 
evaluations might be decisive for their existence. However, there is an important 
obstacle to regime accountability evaluations: next to actually combating anticom-
petitive mergers, every merger control regime produces a deterrence effect. The 
sheer existence of merger control rules and minimum-effective enforcement activi-
ties induces rational firms to abandon anticompetitive merger plans and focus on 
procompetitive asset combinations (or other business strategies) instead. If it can 
be anticipated that a certain merger proposal will fail to pass merger control and 
will eventually be blocked by the authorities, then it is not rational to waste re-
sources on conducting this merger project. If merger control rules and their appli-
cation were crystal-clear, then rational firms would only propose mergers that 
comply with the rules. However, due to the complex nature of merger control – in 
particular in the case of an effects-based approach, deciding cases on a case-by-
case evidence basis – decisions are not fully anticipatable in reality and self-
assessment mistakes by firms are also possible. Notwithstanding, there is a real de-
terrence effect, albeit not a perfect one, and it is virtually impossible to measure it.4 
In contrast to regime accountability, agency accountability targets an impact evalu-
ation of specified single case decisions and attempts to detect decision errors (type 
I and II). Since agency accountability aims to identify mistakes committed by the 
authority in question, it has to consider all the limitations that were outside the 
competence of the authority but still influenced the (quality of the) decision. Such 

3  See for an excellent and much more elaborated discussion of the basic fundaments, motivations 
and processes of the agency accountability-type of ex post evaluation of competition authorities 
(but not so much of the evaluation methods) Kovacic (2006). 
4  See for a recent attempt Buccirossi et al. (2011). Despite their impressive and excellent effort, 
considerable uncertainties and problems remain. 

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limitations may include tight timeframes, budgetary limits, lack of staff or other 
resources as well as institutional limits and restrictions (like deficiencies of the law, 
inadequate standards of proof, political influence, etc.). Furthermore, the ex post 
impact evaluation must respect what information were available at the time of de-
cision. If, for instance, a merger control decision turns out to represent a type II 
decision error (allowance of an anticompetitive merger) in hindsight based upon 
information that was not available at the time of decision (like post-merger market 
data), then the deciding agency or authority cannot be held accountable for this 
‘wrong’ decision. Consequently, agency accountability implies a rather narrow 
scope for impact evaluations of merger decisions. 
From an academic-economics perspective, this narrow scope is unfortunate be-
cause it excludes several causes for type I and type II errors, namely all causes that 
lie outside the competence of the acting competition agency. If, for instance, insti-
tutional flaws force the competition authority to let anticompetitive mergers 
through (for instance, as a consequence of prohibitive standards of proof burdened 
upon the authority) or to prohibit procompetitive mergers (for instance, because of 
an inappropriate prohibition standard), then agency accountability cannot identify 
decision errors. However, in terms of welfare and in terms of the protection of 
competition, severe decision errors may occur, just that the responsibility for these 
decision errors lies outside the competence of the competition authority. From an 
economic perspective, it would be valuable to use ex post impact evaluation of 
merger control decisions to identify all decision errors (irrespective of their causes) 
in order to allow for subsequent learning processes how to improve the merger 
control system (including, for instance, alleviating institutional flaws). Thus, motiva-
tion (III), merger control improvement, also targets specified single decisions, how-
ever, it does so with a broader scope and particularly in the light of new infor-
mation that became available post-merger. Its goal, consequently, cannot be to call 
the deciding authority responsible for the mistake. Instead, it aims to create infor-
mation about welfare-reducing and competition-reducing merger control decisions 
in order to initiate a forward-looking process to identify causes for decision errors 
and derive solutions in order to minimize them in the future. 
According to the reports of 19 competition policy regimes to the 2011 OECD 
roundtable on Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions, 62.1 per cent of the reported 
29 ex post evaluations targeted agency accountability, 34.4 per cent merger control 
improvement and merely 3.5 per cent regime accountability.5 Taking an economic 
perspective, however, this paper will focus on the merger control improvement mo-
tivation. Merger control decisions are ex ante decisions. They attempt to estimate 

5  Approximately 30 jurisdictions were asked to submit reports about their experience with ex post 
impact evaluations of merger control decisions and 19 (Brazil, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Estonia, 
EU, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Af-
rica, Switzerland, UK, U.S.) actually submitted a written report (all reports on file with author). 
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the effect a notified merger will have on the relevant markets if it was cleared by 
the competition authority. If we assume that competition authorities aim to make 
correct merger decisions in the sense of avoiding both type I and type II errors but 
do so in an imperfect world, then an ex post evaluation of past merger control de-
cisions represents an instrument to improve future decisions by learning from past 
mistakes. As soon as merger effects display sufficient regularities (i.e. mergers do 
not represent unique single events), such a controlling of merger policy possesses 
the potential of beneficial improvements of merger control decisions and, thus, 
welfare6. 
However, conducting an ex post impact evaluation of merger control decisions is 
not automatically advantageous. A disadvantage occurs if many decisions of a 
competition authority are found to have been erroneous. Firstly, this may damage 
the reputation of the authority and, thereby, harm the (beneficial) deterrence effect 
of competition rules and policies as well as reduce the norm addressees’ ac-
ceptance of future merger decisions. Secondly, the question of potential damage 
claims by enterprises (type I errors) or by customers and competitors (type II errors) 
following up the ex post identification of a decision error must be taken into con-
sideration (depending on the jurisdiction in question). Furthermore, it must be con-
sidered that the evaluation results themselves set incentives for competition au-
thorities regarding the future selection of cases, possibly inducing a selection bias: 
rational agencies experience incentives to go for easy options, i.e. cases with a high 
probability of receiving enforcement success and positive ex post evaluation (Davies 
& Ormosi 2010: 40). More problematic cases with less-anticipatable evaluation pro-
spects may be neglected. Instead of aiming for the protection of competition or for 
improving welfare, competition authorities may target to receive favorable evalua-
tion results. If ex post evaluation worked perfectly, however, this would not neces-
sarily constitute a considerable problem. 
However, in an imperfect world, ex post impact evaluation may also be subject to 
errors. Another important disadvantage occurs if agencies rely on unreliable evalua-
tion methods, systematically displaying erroneous results regarding the accuracy of 
past merger control decisions. Then, the decision quality could actually deteriorate 
as a consequence of learning from the deficient ex post evaluation. In contrast to 
science in general, the rule of thumb that ‘bad or weak information is still better 
than no information’ does not hold here since the ‘bad’ information triggers a be-
havioral response (Neven & Zenger 2008) by the competition authorities. Therefore, 
any ex post impact evaluation must guarantee a sufficient reliability of its results. In 
other words, reliability becomes a knock-out criterion for the usability of any given 

6  Note that although competition authorities usually follow some type of welfare goal, the specifi-
cation of the welfare goal can differ, for instance and most famously between a consumer wel-
fare standard and a total welfare standard. Also, goals like public interest or freedom of competi-
tion at least implicitly target a welfare goal, albeit through intermediate goals. 

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evaluation method. Given a sufficient minimum reliability, additional criteria can be 
applied to comparatively evaluate the usefulness of ex post evaluation methods for 
competition authorities wanting to engage in systematic ex post evaluations of 
their merger control decisions. 
Method Evaluation Categories 
Ͳ Reliability of results: competence of the method to identify decision errors. 
This is a prior category (knock-out criterion); any method that fails to meet a 
minimum reliability cannot be recommended.  
Ͳ Applicability: range of the application in terms of competition effects (sta-
tionary, dynamic, evolutionary), types of cases, markets & industries. 
Ͳ Agency resource intensity: the resource and competency requirements 
(‘costs’) of applying the method.  
In contrast to those employed in other studies, these evaluation categories partly 
possess a hierarchical structure. Buccirossi et al. (2008: 464) argue that ex post 
evaluation “techniques cannot be ranked, as each has its advantages and draw-
backs”; “they are not mutually exclusive, and it is possible, or even advisable, to use 
more than one simultaneously in order to minimize the probability of errors in the 
evaluation” (465). However, if a technique does not comply with minimum reliabil-
ity standards, it cannot contribute to better evaluation – even within a mix of in-
struments. Quite the contrary, it actually jeopardizes any beneficial effect of an ex 
post impact evaluation and might even generate harmful effects (increase of type I 
and type II errors). A systematically false evaluation can easily lead to an endoge-
nous deterioration of merger control through the considerable incentives for the 
competition authority to produce decisions that pass the (flawed, defective) evalua-
tion test. This danger is particularly great if additionally a feasibility bias comes into 
play. A comparatively unreliable but cheap and easy-to-do technique is likely to get 
an inappropriately high weight in practice because of the economics of administra-
tion. Just because it is easily feasible, it is likely to get frequently employed. For the-
se reasons, reliability receives the accentuated position of being the knock-out cri-
terion: a failure in reliability cannot be compensated by a good performance in one 
of the other categories. For instance, it does not help that any given method can be 
easily applied with minimal resources if the results are not sufficiently reliable! As a 
consequence of this difference in approach, the results of this paper differ from 
those of the few older studies (Buccirossi et al. 2008; Davies & Ormosi 2010). 
The main methods that are available for conducting ex post impact evaluations of 
merger decisions can be categorized into the following types: 
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Ͳ structural models and simulations (section 2.2), 
Ͳ difference-in-differences (DiD) approaches (section 2.3),  
Ͳ event studies (section 2.4),  
Ͳ surveys (section 2.5), and 
Ͳ case studies (section 2.6). 
These methods are analyzed in the following sections according to the evaluation 
criteria developed in this section. 
2.2 Structural Models and Simulations 
This method of ex post impact evaluation is based on (i) an explicit formal model of 
the nature of competition in the relevant market(s) of the merger, (ii) calibrating 
this model with real world data, and (iii) an assessment of how the actual equilibri-
um would change in the counterfactual scenario (e.g. merger vs. no merger; reme-
dy x vs. remedy y, etc.) on the basis of simulation results (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 
12).7  
Reliability 
The main advantage of this method is its reliance on a sound foundation on mod-
ern state-of-the-art game-theoretical industrial economics (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 
465; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14; Budzinski 2011). Furthermore, the accuracy of the 
underlying model can be tested through calibration with real market data. This is in 
particular true for an ex post analysis. Only a sufficiently fine-tuned calibration of 
the estimated model to the characteristics of the underlying market will reproduce 
the actual market development (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465). In contrast to ex ante 
simulation where the extrapolation of the pre-merger market model to the – at the 
time of the decision – hypothetical post-merger equilibrium generates several 
shortcomings regarding the predictive power of simulation models (Budzinski & 
Ruhmer 2010; Budzinski 2011), ex post simulation alleviates many of these limita-
tions. Insofar, criticism that this method requires a large set of assumptions whose 
fit to the actual market is sensitive for the reliability of the results (Buccirossi et al. 
2008: 466; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14) appears to be more appropriate for ex ante 
simulations than for ex post simulations. The fit can actually be controlled rather 
well. Furthermore, the accuracy of the assumptions made at the time of the deci-

7  Overviews are presented by Buccirossi et al. (2008: 465-466); Budzinski & Ruhmer (2010: 312-
314); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 12-15). Examples of applications include Nevo (2000); Pinske & 
Slade (2004); Peters (2006); Weinberg & Hosken (2008). Merger simulations may also be used by 
the competition authority when deciding upon a merger (overview: Budzinski & Ruhmer 2010). 
These ex ante simulations serve to predict the post-merger equilibrium, whereas ex post simula-
tion compares the actual post-merger decision market equilibrium with counterfactual equilibria. 


11 

sion/intervention by the competition authority can be evaluated through this 
method (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14).  
However, this is strictly true only for the actual market development. In order to 
assess whether the merger decision has been correct, the actual post-merger devel-
opment must be compared to a counterfactual. It is one of the advantages of this 
method that it allows for simulating alternative scenarios (counterfactuals), corre-
sponding to different changes in the underlying market environment (Buccirossi et 
al. 2008: 465). To some limited extent, the pre-merger market may provide guid-
ance for the counterfactuals, however, more accurately, the model should be used 
to simulate alternative post-decision scenarios. These simulations, then, rely on the 
assumption that the underlying competition model would have been the same if 
the counterfactual scenarios actually happened. While this assumption may be true 
for many cases, it is well possible that a big merger impacts a market to an extent 
that it changes the fundamental nature of competition (Budzinski 2011). If done 
seriously and with a view to the limitations, however, structural models and ex post 
simulation produce reliable results, providing valuable insights into the accuracy of 
merger control decisions from an ex post perspective. 
Applicability 
Structural models and simulations enjoy the advantage that in theory they can be 
applied to all kinds of mergers and all types of merger control decisions (prohibi-
tions, clearances, remedies). However, their applicability to real-world markets is 
limited by, firstly, limits to feasibility of modeling the market and, secondly, by the 
availability of data. 
Typically, the ability to model the relevant market requires the underlying market to 
match one of the popular standard models of modern oligopoly economics, in par-
ticular the game-theoretic homogeneous Cournot oligopoly model (quantity com-
petition with rather homogenous goods) or the game-theoretic heterogeneous Ber-
trand oligopoly model (price competition with differentiated products). If real-
market competition cannot be adequately described with one the available stand-
ard models (in their most modern and comprehensive versions), this method can 
hardly be used for impact evaluation purposes. Furthermore and therefore, ex post 
evaluation of merger control decisions through structural models and simulations 
typically focuses on price and quantity effects. It tends to neglect other dimensions 
of competition, like innovation, repositioning, structural breaks, market entry, di-
versity, etc. (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14; Budzinski & Ruhmer 2010). Next to some 
more stationary elements of competition, it is particularly the dimensions of dy-
namic and evolutionary competition that run the danger of being neglected in such 
models. Even though it is possible to include stylized (and simplified) elements of 
non-price effects in merger simulations in special cases (see exemplary Froeb et al. 
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2007), the inclusion of several of these dimensions and, in particular, the interac-
tion between the dimensions represent a near-to-impossible task (Budzinski 2011: 
116-118). As a result, the simulation method is skewed towards certain types of 
markets that are feasible to modeling and, thus, is likely to suffer from a sample 
selection bias (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14).  
Secondly, the extensive and ambitious data requirements regarding both quantity 
and quality of the data further narrow down the number of markets where this 
method can be applied for ex post impact evaluations (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 466; 
Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14). Furthermore, some authors claim that this method is 
not applicable to cases involving behavioral remedies as a special type of merger 
clearances under conditions or with commitments (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465-466). 
In summary, the restrictions regarding applicability are considerable.  
Resource Intensity 
Structural modeling and simulation probably represents the most sophisticated 
method to assess competitive impacts. Moreover, the evaluation must be done on 
a case-by-case level. Consequently, it requires extensive agency resources to either 
engage in producing this type of ex post evaluations or commission respective 
studies. A full-blown ex post merger control decision impact analysis involves high-
end economic expertise (both regarding theoretical economics and empirical meth-
ods/econometrics), time-intensive data collection and generation as well as in most 
cases comprehensive cooperation from companies within the relevant market. 
While the latter can normally be enforced in the context of a merger control deci-
sion without considerable problems, any cooperation of companies regarding ex 
post analyses is voluntary and may require some compensation.8 Notwithstanding, 
simplified simulation approaches have been and are being developed (‘back-of-the-
envelope simulations’) in order to reduce the resource intensity and data require-
ments. However, there is trade-off between ease of applicability and precision of 
estimated results (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465). 
2.3 Difference-in-Differences 
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) methods encompass roughly all methods that evalu-
ate a merger control decision by comparing the post-decision performance of fun-
damental market data (like prices or market shares) with (i) the pre-decision market 
development and (ii) a control market, which is sufficiently similar to the relevant 
market but unaffected by the event (the merger control decision).9 Many studies 

8  This is different, of course, if a competition policy regime can mandate companies to cooperate 
in ex post analyses. 
9  Overviews are presented by Bergman (2008: 394-396); Buccirossi et al. (2008: 466-467); Wein-
berg (2008); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 20-24). Recent examples of applications include Ashenfelter 
& Hosken (2011); Ashenfelter et al. (2011); Dobson & Piga (2011); Tenn & Yunn (2011); Jiménez 

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belonging to this method are direct econometric analysis of price and market share 
evolution with the control market serving to isolate the impact of the merger con-
trol decision from other influences on prices and market shares (often called ‘exter-
nal shocks’). Put simply, the underlying concept is the assumption that decision-
independent influences on the market development are also present in the control 
market whereas the decision-dependent influences are only present in the relevant 
market of the merger control decision. 
Reliability 
The charm of DiD methods is that they analyze actually observed data from the rel-
evant product market. Thus, they represent an analysis of what actually happened 
on the post-decision market. Moreover, the counterfactual is also real and does not 
depend on non-testable and restrictive (or even heroic) theoretical assumptions 
(Davies & Ormosi 2010: 22). However, the sensitive problem is to find a suitable 
control market that is (i) close enough to the relevant market in order to display the 
same ‘external’ influences but (ii) sufficiently far away not to be influenced by the 
event (the merger control decision). Furthermore, the same ‘external’ influences 
must also exert the same impact on prices (etc.) in the relevant market and in the 
control market (Simpson & Schmidt 2008; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 21-22). While this 
is often challenging, modern econometric techniques provide suitable instruments 
to address these problems – albeit, not erasing them.  
Another issue with DiD methods is that they are inherently atheoretical (Davies & 
Ormosi 2010: 22-23) in the sense that they neither provide nor rely on explicit 
causes-consequences theories about the underlying competition dynamics and 
mechanisms. If a DiD study finds a price increase due to the merger, for instance, 
then it does not tell anything about why the merger increased prices.10 While this 
may be a disadvantage in terms of understanding and learning from the evaluation 
results, it represents an advantage to the extent that complex competition dimen-
sions that are rarely incorporated into modeling and simulation are implicitly ac-
counted for by ‘just’ measuring the actual effects. However, this is only true to the 
extent that these competition dimensions (dynamic and evolutionary efficiencies of 
the competitive process) are reflected in measurable variables, like prices, 
elasticities, measures for the number and variety of products, etc.  
  

& Perdiguero (2012). Kwoka & Greenfield (2011: 15) report that they have found “well over one 
hundred such studies” with one of the earliest being Barton & Sherman (1984).   
10  Admitted, this is conceptualized from the perspective of theoretical economics. Of course, there 
is an underlying theory in the sense that it is hypothesized that the price increase is caused by 
the merger (in the sense of a correlation). 
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Applicability 
The applicability is firstly constrained by the requirement of the existence of a suffi-
ciently appropriate control group, which is often difficult to find (Simpson & 
Schmidt 2008; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 21-23). Secondly, it is much more difficult to 
ex post evaluate merger prohibitions with this method compared to cleared mer-
gers which is why a selection bias towards analyzing clearances is likely to occur. 
Counterfactuals can be more easily constructed with cleared mergers because the 
market development prior and after the merger provides guidance for evaluation 
(prior to the merger the counterfactual actually existed, albeit at a different point in 
time). In contrast, in the case of prohibited mergers, the market development does 
not provide much guidance. How the market would have looked with the complet-
ed merger cannot be inferred from any real situation, neither from the pre-decision 
period, nor from a control market (Neven & Zenger 2008: 478). Consequently, 
there might be a bias towards merger clearance decisions and, thus, towards de-
tecting type-II errors (false allowances). From a data availability perspective, how-
ever, the range of applicability is rather comprehensive since the required data 
should be comparatively easily collectable for most markets.  
Resource Intensity 
Like structural modeling and simulations, DiD methods must be done on a case-by-
case level and require sophisticated econometric knowledge. However, DiD analyses 
enjoy the advantage that they require comparatively fewer resources than simula-
tions because of their atheoretical character (no sophisticated modeling is required) 
and the laxer data requirements. Furthermore, cooperation with companies in the 
market is usually not needed. 
2.4 Event Studies 
The basic concept behind event studies is the assumption that welfare effects of 
horizontal mergers can be evaluated by looking at the stock price reactions (ab-
normal returns) of the willing-to-merge companies (Ellert 1976) and, in particular, 
of the rivals of the merging firms (Eckbo 1983).11 More precisely, the stock market 
reaction to special ‘events’, like the announcement of a merger by the companies 
and the announcement of the merger control decision by the competition authori-
ty,12 is isolated and interpreted in terms of conclusions about prospective competi-

11  Overviews are provided by Bergman (2008: 392-394); Buccirossi et al. (2008: 467-469); Davies & 
Ormosi (2010: 15-20). Examples of applications are presented by Ellert (1976); Eckbo (1983, 
1992); Stillman (1983); Eckbo & Wier (1985); Aktas, Bodt & Roll (2007); Duso, Neven & Röller 
(2007); Diepold et al. (2008); Serdareviþ & Teplý (2009); Duso, Gugler & Szücs (2010); Duso, 
Gugler & Yurtoglu (2011). 
12  Other relevant events in this context could be the announcement of the competition authority 
that it intends to challenge a merger (EU: initiation of phase-II proceedings, statement of objec-
tions; U.S.: initiation of an in-depth investigation or announced intention to go to the courts). 

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tive effects of the merger. In a nutshell, an increase in rivals’ share prices implies an 
anticompetitive merger (price-increasing), a decrease implies a procompetitive 
merger (efficiency-enhancing). 
Reliability 
Event studies that serve as an instrument for ex post impact evaluation of merger 
control decisions represent a rather specific version of event studies that depart to 
a relevant extent from ‘ordinary’ event studies. While ordinary event studies try to 
explain influence factors on stock prices, event studies as evaluation instruments 
employ the stock price reactions as an evaluation standard. This yields a most im-
portant difference: event studies for evaluation purposes assign a normative value 
to stock price reactions; they act as referees or judges on policy decisions, here: 
merger control decisions. In contrast, ‘ordinary’ event studies do not connect any 
normative value to stock price reactions. Instead, in ordinary event studies, stock 
price movements represent the dependent variable (that gets explained by the 
events), whereas event studies for evaluation purposes turn the stock price move-
ments into something that has an explanatory power on the (competitive) quality 
of a merger and, subsequently, on the related merger control decision.  
This remarkable difference is important because turning event studies (explaining 
stock price reactions) into a referee (judging about economic effects) inevitably in-
troduces several problematic assumptions. The reliability of event studies as an 
evaluation method sensitively relies on these assumptions which are both theoreti-
cally and empirically questionable.13 
First of all, the event study method for evaluation purposes crucially relies on the 
efficient financial markets hypothesis (EFMH): if financial markets work perfectly 
and all actors on these markets act perfectly rational (actually: hyper-rational) un-
der perfect information (or at least in full knowledge of all relevant information), 
then share prices instantly reflect the ‘true’ value of these shares to investors. Thus, 
changes in stock prices that occur as a reaction to merger decision-related events 
(merger announcement, announcement of investigation by competition authority, 
merger control decision) reveal the respective market assessment, which under the 
condition of the EFMH can be thought to reflect the unbiased and superior infor-
mation of ‘insiders’. In the case of perfect information and hyper-rationality, insider 
knowledge includes information about future effects on competition from the re-
spective event. Thus, under these conditions – and sensitively and exclusively under 
these conditions (!) – stock price reactions could serve as an evaluation standard for 
the appropriateness of merger control decisions (because the stock market actors 

13  See for critical reflections, inter alia, McAfee & Williams (1988); Eckbo (1989); Werden & Williams 
(1989); Hopkins & Connor (1992); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 19); Reynolds (2008); Fridolfsson & 
Stennek (2010); Beigi & Budzinski (2012). 
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know and reveal ‘true and complete’ information that the competition authority 
does not have). This is exactly what is done by several of the studies cited at the 
beginning of this subchapter. 
However, the plausibility of the EFMH is questionable at best. Perfect information is 
empirically not available. Neither do agents on financial markets act hyper-rational, 
nor do the markets in total reflect superior knowledge about competitive effects 
that, furthermore, at the time of the stock market reaction lie in the future. The 
implausibility and fundamental flaws of the EFMH, which are actually well-accepted 
in modern financial economics, render this method inappropriate to evaluate policy 
decisions in an imperfect world with imperfect actors and markets. 
Still, the reliability is further put into doubt by a couple of additional problems that 
would still occur even if the EFMH held true. For instance, the literature refers to 
ambiguities in interpreting the observed stock price changes (Davies & Ormosi 
2010: 18 with an impressive overview) and the unclear causal relationship of stock 
market movements with merger announcements and control decisions (Neven & 
Zenger 2008: 487). The fields of business activity that are affected by the merger 
control decision must have a sufficiently high importance within the merging com-
panies, which are often multi-product and multi-subsidiary-companies (i.e. groups 
of companies or concerns). Usually, non-prohibition merger control decisions (inter 
alia, conditional approvals) merely affect just few of the markets involved. These 
few markets, then, must exert an outstanding influence on the business prospects 
of the companies and their main rivals (which usually also are multi-product and 
multi-subsidiary concerns), so that their (non-) regulation dominates the stock price 
reactions. 
Furthermore, several studies need to assume a price-umbrella effect in order to in-
terpret the evaluation through the stock markets. Rivals’ profits benefit from an 
anticompetitive merger because of the ‘rule of one price’: the price for all compa-
nies in the market increases. In contrast, rivals’ profits suffer from a procompetitive 
merger because the merged entity is more efficient now. However, this refers to a 
specific oligopoly model (horizontal effects in quantity competition with homoge-
neous goods) that (i) hardly reflects the nature of competition in many merger 
markets (heterogeneous product markets; mixtures of horizontal, vertical and con-
glomerate effects) and (ii) may not be the way that financial markets’ agents think 
about competitive effects from mergers14. More advanced industrial economics 
models analyzing heterogeneous markets, price competition, variants of non-price 
competition, dynamic settings or vertical and conglomerate effects do not find 

14  I am not aware of any empirical research that validates that stock market actors actually believe 
in anticompetitive mergers being good for rivals and procompetitive mergers being bad for ri-
vals. Doing this empirical study would be a precondition for providing interpretations and policy 
recommendations resting on this assumption, though. 

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strict price-umbrella effects and effects on rivals may actually differ in one and the 
same (heterogeneous) market. While these models picture (elements of) real-world 
competition more appropriately, they can easily render any clear-cut and unambig-
uous interpretation of stock market signals impossible. Relying on inappropriate 
assumptions about the nature of competition and its understanding by stock mar-
ket agents (who may have other ideas about competitive effects than those derived 
from the simplified homogeneous Cournot case) entails the danger of systematic 
evaluation errors because of the event study evaluation method. As a consequence, 
a competition authority could be driven into deteriorating the quality of its merger 
control decisions by relying on ex post impact evaluation by event studies. 
Consequently, a sound theoretical foundation, rooted in modern competition eco-
nomics, is missing in most of the available event studies. Even furthermore, inextri-
cable feedback loops occur in particular if the EFMH would hold. If financial mar-
kets are efficient, then they will anticipate (i) merger control decisions and (ii) their 
own influence on ex post evaluation and decisions – and reflect this in the stock 
prices! Eventually, stock price reactions to merger announcements do not actually 
represent an ex post evaluation as they happen before or at the time of the merger 
(control) decision. With the exception of the stock market reactions to the final 
merger control decision, the information is actually available to competition au-
thorities during the decision process and might influence agency decisions.15  
In summary, the event study method fails to meet the knock-out criterion of 
providing a sufficient minimum reliability. There is no indication that financial mar-
ket reactions represent an accurate prediction of the competitive effects16, howev-
er, there is ample indication to the contrary.  
Applicability 
Due to easy-to-access data (stock market prices), event studies can basically be per-
formed on all types of mergers. If one believes in the appropriateness of the under-
lying assumptions, then event studies anticipate all types of competitive effects as 

15  However, competition authorities enjoy comprehensive investigation powers and, therefore, pos-
sess additional information (internal documents, etc.) that the stock market actors are not aware 
of. This casts doubt on the ‘superior insider information’ assumption since competition authori-
ties many actually be better informed than the stock market. Thus, they may decide deliberately 
and for a reason not to follow stock market reactions (Neven & Zenger 2008: 487). 
16  Even Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu (2010) – with a research design driven by the purpose to demon-
strate the usefulness of the event study – do not find convincing evidence when correlating ex 
ante stock market predictions with ex post balance sheet data for carefully selected cases. Only 
under rather exceptional conditions do the stock markets work as a somewhat good predictor 
(inter alia, specific pre-announcement event windows need to be defined and among all the pos-
sible constellations, merely some work and it remains theoretically unclear why). And even this 
does not alleviate most of the concerns with using event studies as evaluators. See for more criti-
cal discussion McAfee & Williams (1988), Werden & Williams (1989), Reynolds (2008) and 
Fridolfsson & Stennek (2010). 
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long as these influence profitability. However, the interpretation of the stock mar-
ket price signals limits the application to horizontal mergers since non-horizontal 
mergers are difficult to assess because of the many and ambiguous ways that anti-
competitive or procompetitive effects can affect the relevant markets. Problems 
also arise for horizontal mergers involving differentiated product markets. An obvi-
ous – but also practically relevant – limitation is that merging companies and their 
rivals need to be stock market companies with a sufficient trade volume and fre-
quency (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 20). This entails the danger of a sample selection 
bias. 
Resource Intensity 
The easy accessibility of the data implies comparatively low resource intensity for 
conducting these type of studies. Furthermore, even though event studies can be 
done on large samples of mergers and without looking into many case details they 
can still provide results about type I and type II errors on a case level. The event 
study method does require advanced econometric expertise in order to carefully 
isolate the event influence on observed stock prices movements from other influ-
ences. Theoretical expertise is merely required for the interpretation of the stock 
market signals. Cooperation with companies in the market is not needed. 
2.5 Surveys 
Survey-based ex post impact evaluations are merger control decision reviews based 
on follow-up questionnaires and/or interviews.17 Two types can be distinguished. 
Firstly, the opinions and perceptions of market participants (merging parties, com-
petitors, suppliers, customers, etc.) are collected. Secondly, surveys among experts, 
peers and/or among practitioners can be conducted, for instance targeting perti-
nently specialized academics (economists, legal scientists), relevantly specialized 
lawyers and judges, or (non-involved) managers. The common underlying concept 
is to benefit from asymmetric information. In the case of market participants, supe-
rior insider knowledge is targeted, whereas in the second case superior (academic) 
expertise and experience is expected to yield a beneficial ex post evaluation.  
Reliability 
The economics rationale behind conducting survey-based impact evaluations is 
rooted in information asymmetries. If market participants in the first type or ex-
perts in the second type have superior explicit and/or tacit (ex post) knowledge 
about the impact of a merger control decision on the underlying competitive pro-
cess, then questionnaires and interviews serve to collect and reveal this knowledge 
to the evaluators. The nature of the asymmetric information implies an atheoretical 

17  Overviews are provided by Buccirossi et al. (2008: 469-470); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 24-25). Ex-
amples of applications are presented by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005); Deloitte (2009).  

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character of this method (apart from the conceptual information-economics back-
ground), which at the same time means that all types of competitive effects, 
whether quantitatively measurable or not, can potentially be captured. 
On the downside, surveys depend on the assumption that insiders and/or experts (i) 
actually have superior information and (ii) are willing to share this information 
without strategic distortions. The danger of a respondent bias is particularly high in 
the case of market participants because they will rationally anticipate that their in-
formation influences future merger control decisions. At first sight, expert com-
mentaries should be less prone to respondent biases, however, this is only true 
when the expert has no party interest and is not looking for future assignments 
either from norm addressees or the competition authority. 
Another issue refers to the number of potential survey participants. Since individual 
opinions are rather likely to suffer from strategic or cognitive perception biases, a 
sufficiently large number of potential respondents is required. Regarding expert 
commentaries, this implies that case reviews by single experts are less valuable than 
surveys among a larger number of experts. 
Applicability 
This method probably represents the only available method to capture all competi-
tion dimensions and effects and is applicable to all types of merger cases. It de-
mands virtually no data requirements and can be employed to generate qualitative 
empirical data about non-quantifiable competition dimensions. Thus, this method 
can also be applied when virtually no ‘hard’ data is available (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 
469), which is a problem in a considerable number of markets. The applicability 
may be limited because of low respondent rates, however. Although this method 
has so far predominantly been chosen to assess the total performance of competi-
tion authorities (benchmarking, best practices) and not to evaluate merger deci-
sions on a case level (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 25), both types (insider-based and ex-
perts-based surveys) can also be applied to evaluate single cases. Once the relevant 
questionnaires are available, it is comparatively easy to repeat the survey, so that 
this method is also realistically dynamically applicable in order to capture more 
long-run effects and changes. 
Resource Intensity 
Developing questionnaires, conducting interviews, motivating respondents and 
professionally analyzing the responses require manpower and statistical expert 
knowledge. Furthermore, cooperation of market participants (and/or experts) is 
unavoidable. Notwithstanding, the resource intensity should be comparatively low. 
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2.6 Expert Case Studies 
Another type of ex post reviews of merger control decisions is represented by case 
studies conducted by (economic) experts.18 They provide a single expert opinion 
based upon a comprehensive review of the case decision. Despite similarities re-
garding the underlying information asymmetry rationale, case studies are distinct 
from surveys among experts. They represent the opinion of one (team of) expert(s) 
as opposed to a representative number of interviewed experts and provide an in-
dependent analysis of the case instead of answers to questions phrased by the sur-
veying agency. However, case studies are not perfectly distinct from the other 
methods discussed in the preceding paragraphs as they may embrace mixtures of 
those methods as a part of the comprehensive case analysis. Existing expert case 
studies are partly presented by independent experts, following scientific curiosity, 
or by experts that have been involved in the merger control process (as party ex-
perts either for involved companies or for the competition authority). 
Reliability 
Similar to surveys, the reliability of case studies depends on the existence of superi-
or knowledge on the side of the academic expert and her willingness to offer this 
knowledge in an unbiased way. The first points to the competence of the expert, 
whereas the second refers to the independence of the expert. For a case study to 
represent a minimum reliable instrument, the expert must not have any party inter-
est in the case. This implies that he has not acted as an expert consultant or expert 
witness during the merger control process – neither for the merging companies, 
their rivals or suppliers and customers, nor for the competition authority. Moreo-
ver, and much more complicated to safeguard, he must not be looking for posi-
tioning himself as a candidate for lucrative future experts mandates and appoint-
ments. The question of biases may play a considerably more important role here 
compared to the other methods since the evaluation result merely relies on one 
(team of) experts. 
Applicability 
In addition to the possible party interest bias, affecting the reliability of case stud-
ies, the existing case studies display a considerable sample selection bias towards 
few popular and controversial cases and hardly represent systematic ex post impact 
evaluations. However, this might be due to a lack of more systematic assignments 
for case studies called for by the competition authority (or any competent review-

18  Overviews are provided by Bergman (2008: 393-394); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 25). Examples of 
applications are presented, inter alia, by the chapters in Kwoka & White (2008); Lyons (2009) as 
well as by Reynolds & Ordover (2002); Aigner et al. (2006); Budzinski & Christiansen (2007); 
Budzinski & Wacker (2007); Budzinski (2012a); Budzinski & Larsen (2012). In addition to econom-
ic case studies, they are many legal-sciences case studies which are neglected in this paper due to 
its economic focus.  
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ing body). Case studies do possess the prospects of providing insightful ‘holistic’ 
reviews of merger control decisions, weighing different angles and considering all 
types of competitive effects including non-quantifiable and non-measurable effects 
in the review. 
Resource Intensity 
Employed as a more systematic evaluation method, expert case studies obviously 
require the recruitment and funding of competent and independent experts. Each 
single case study project, if done seriously, may be rather comprehensive with re-
source intensity also depending on the use of other methods during the case study 
by the expert. Cooperation with market participants may not be necessary, but, 
depending on the case in question, might be desirable.  
 
3. Comparing the Evaluation Methods  
The first – and probably not surprising – conclusion from the analysis of the evalua-
tion methods is that there is no perfect method available. Instead, each method 
has its strengths and weaknesses. Structural models and sophisticated simulation 
models probably represent the most reliable method and certainly the method that 
is best rooted in modern economic theory. However, the advanced sophistication 
of the models and the high degree of complexity of this method is attended by 
considerable limitations regarding its applicability as well as by extraordinary re-
source intensity. Although maybe desirable from a scientific point of view, a com-
prehensive and systematic employment of this method for ex post impact evalua-
tions of merger control decisions appears to be persistently unrealistic. DiD meth-
ods are considerably less sophisticated and demanding regarding theoretical mod-
eling (of the competitive process) and data requirements. However, they still repre-
sent serious quantitative analyses soundly rooted in economics. Furthermore, they 
require medium resource intensity. Surveys may lag behind structural modeling, 
simulations and DiDs in terms of providing economics-based quantitative analyses, 
however, the survey method displays its strengths in particular in the blind spot of 
the advanced quantitative methods – namely capturing markets with insufficient 
data availability (for the other methods) as well as non-quantifiable competition 
dimensions. Similar to case studies, surveys serve to provide a context for the inter-
pretation (and selection) of simulation scenarios or econometric results. Thus, they 
represent a natural complement to structural models, simulations and DiDs.19 How-
ever, the results of surveys and case studies always require critical reflection due to 

19  “Whenever feasible, a survey should always be carried out to add insights and help the interpre-
tation of the results obtained through other techniques, as well as to investigate some aspects of 
the development of a market that are difficult to understand from hard data” (Buccirossi et al. 
2008: 469). 
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several potential biases.20 Case studies may be more sensitive to theses biases due 
to relying on fewer experts. In summary, all these four methods display sufficient 
reliability to be (conditionally) used for evaluation purposes (but see the note of 
caution in the upcoming section 4). 
The concerns regarding an employment of insufficiently reliable methods highlight 
the accentuated importance of minimum reliability standards for employed meth-
ods compared to applicability and resource intensity arguments. Obviously, studies 
based on each method can be designed and executed in inaccurate and insufficient 
fashion. Therefore, this is not the issue at hand. Instead, the question is whether 
any method in question produces minimum reliable results given a serious and ac-
curate employment. While four of the five analyzed methods meet this knock-out 
criterion, the event study method fails to do so (see section 2.4).21 Moreover, the 
lack of minimum reliability – even if employed in a most serious and advanced way 
– goes along with a strong feasibility bias. Event studies are comparatively ‘easy to 
do’ (in particular because of data availability) and, therefore, they are likely to re-
ceive an over-proportional weight in impact evaluations of merger control decisions 
in the real world – which is characterized by various resource restrictions. Already 
the impressive number of event studies among the existing impact evaluation liter-
ature is telling in this regard. The combination of lack of minimum reliability and 
feasibility bias is particularly dangerous because it entails a considerable probability 
of systematic evaluation errors (i.e. correct decisions are found to be wrong and 
wrong decisions are found to be correct during the evaluation). The systematically 
deficient evaluation results then in turn provide incentives for competition authori-
ties to adapt their merger control decision practice to the deficient evaluation (in 
order to maximize positive reviews; agency accountability). As a consequence, the 
impact evaluation systematically deteriorates the quality of merger control. There-
fore, event studies cannot be recommended for evaluation purposes. 
This has considerable implications for the common call for employing a method-
mix for impact evaluation. Since all described methods display strengths and weak-
ness, the literature consequently favors employing a method-mix (Buccirossi et al. 
2008; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 25-26). While Davies and Ormosi (2010) emphasize 
the benefits of employing alternative methods to the same cases in order to learn 
from differences in the assessment, Buccirossi et al. (2008) put a stronger focus on 
relating the methods to case types that suit their individual strengths and weak-
nesses. While principally agreeing to advocate methods-mixes, my analysis deviates 
from the results of the previous literature by rejecting the event study method due 
to a lack of reliability (see the preceding paragraph and section 2.4). Since the 
technique entails the danger of systematic evaluation errors, it cannot contribute to 

20  Notwithstanding, all evaluation results from all methods should be met with critical reflection! 
21  It must be emphasized that this does not refer to the event study method per se but only to its 
(mis-)application as an evaluation method for policy decisions (see section 2.4).
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better evaluation within any method-mix. Instead, there is a considerable likelihood 
that it generates harmful effects (increase in type I and type II errors) due to the 
feasibility bias (increasing the probability of an over-proportional influence in prac-
tice). 
In the context of the 2011 OECD roundtable on competition policy, more specifical-
ly on “Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions”, 19 jurisdictions submitted written 
notes about their experiences with ex post impact evaluation of merger control de-
cisions, reporting a total of 29 cases.22 Within this sample, 44.9 per cent of all eval-
uations were predominantly based on surveys, 24.1 per cent on DiDs, 20.7 per cent 
on structural/simulation models, as well as 10.3 per cent on event studies. No 
commissioned or in-house expert case studies were reported. All ex post reviews 
were commissioned by competition authorities except in Norway where the gov-
ernment mandates the evaluation. 48.3 per cent of the studies were done by exter-
nal consultants, whereas 55.2 per cent were conducted in-house.23 Virtually all 
studies represented stand-alone analyses and no systematic review of representa-
tive samples of merger control decisions. Furthermore, the employment of a com-
bination of methods was the exception rather than the rule. Even though this sam-
ple is certainly not representative, the figures hint towards a bias in favor of meth-
ods with comparatively low resource intensity (feasibility bias), in particular as a 
considerable share of the structural modeling and simulations employed simplified 
‘back-of-the envelope’ simulations rather than full-blown, sophisticated models. 
This is not surprising since resource restrictions play an important role in the every-
day business of real-world competition authorities. At the same time, competition 
authorities seem to possess a healthy skepticism towards event studies. 
 
4. Conclusion: A Note of Caution 
Ex post impact evaluation of merger control decisions should be shy to be con-
fronted with excessive expectations from and/or interpretations of the evaluation 
results. Since neither perfect methods nor a perfect method-mix are available, a 
cautious approach towards ex post evaluation of merger decisions seems appropri-
ate.24 A systematic and comprehensive ex post impact evaluation of merger control 
decisions does not appear to be realistically feasible for the foreseeable future 

22  Approximately 30 jurisdictions were asked to submit reports about their experience with ex post 
impact evaluations of merger control decisions and 19 (Brazil, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Estonia, 
EU, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Af-
rica, Switzerland, UK, U.S.) actually submitted a written report (all reports on file with author). 
23  Apparently, a couple of studies were done both in-house and externally, which is why the per-
centages add up to more than 100 here. 
24  Much in the same spirit, Davies and Ormosi (2010: 26) emphasize the problems, shortcomings 
and limitations of all available evaluation methods rather than the merits and demand further re-
search. 
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against the background of both the (reliability- and applicability-) limitations of 
available methods and resource restrictions of competition authorities. Therefore, it 
is very important that competition authorities conducting and responding to im-
pact evaluations are aware of the limits and deficiencies of the different empirical 
methods. In line with this, it is essential to link empirical results to economic theory 
about competition and feedback their interpretation with theoretical knowledge 
and insights about the competitive process. Empirical results, irrespective of their 
econometric sophistication, always need to be put into context against the back-
ground of sound theory. Any pure empiricism that blindly relies on ‘numbers’ and 
adjusts competition policy to it without referring back to a sound theoretical 
framework runs the danger of deteriorating merger control instead of improving it. 
However, if the inherent limitations are respected and if the empirical results are 
put into context by competition economics theory, then ex post impact evaluations 
can contribute to improving merger control and generating welfare effects. 
 From an economic perspective, ex post impact evaluation should focus on generat-
ing knowledge and learning about actual effects of merger control decisions. How-
ever, the focus should be not so much on counting mistakes or successes of com-
petition authorities (accountability motives). Instead, it should focus on how both 
the merger control framework and the decision practices can be improved for fu-
ture decisions (merger control improvement). The reason for this shift in focus is 
threefold. Firstly, attempting to record the past mistake-success-balance of compe-
tition authorities requires to strictly acknowledge the original constraints for the 
decision (timeframes, available resources, available information, institutional flaws, 
standard of proofs, etc.). If an ‘erroneous’ decision was due to such constraints, the 
competition authority cannot really be blamed. However, secondly, such an ap-
proach overburdens the available methods and, moreover, limits the learning po-
tential from ex post evaluations. Thirdly, if ex post evaluation is driven by the desire 
of external accountability of the competition authority, then a rational behavioral 
response of the authority would be to maximize evaluation success instead of con-
sumer or social welfare (see 2.1).  
It is more beneficial to conduct ex post merger decision impact evaluations with a 
focus on broad learning about all the effects of these decisions (irrespective of con-
temporary decision constraints for the authority) in order to generate knowledge 
about improving the merger control framework and the actual decision practice. As 
this implies ‘learning from many cases for general policy’ instead of attempting to 
‘conclude from single cases to other single cases’. Such an approach is also better 
fitted to the capacities of the available evaluation methods. For instance, if a result 
of many case studies is that anticompetitive mergers are allowed because the 
standard of proof and the allocation of the burden to proof are too ambitious for 
the competition authority to succeed in blocking such mergers, then consequences 


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for the rules about proof standards and burdens should be drawn. It would be dis-
satisfying ‘only’ to conclude that the competition authority committed no mistakes 
because it had no choice but to allow the anticompetitive merger due to institu-
tional flaws outside its competence. 
Eventually, an important overall conclusion can be derived. Ex post impact evalua-
tion of competition policy decisions is most beneficial if it is a scientific task per-
formed with a view to generate knowledge about the effects of mergers and mer-
ger control decisions on competition and welfare. Knowledge that then can be em-
bodied in better competition rules, provisions, or assessment practices in order to 
improve future decisions. The available methods for impact evaluation are much 
more suitable to provide knowledge for a ‘better-rules-‘based competition policy 
than to draw conclusions on case-by-case basis. As such, the competencies of ex 
post impact evaluation methods fit to recent calls for rooting competition policy 
more firmly on economics-based rebuttable presumptions (Baker & Shapiro 2008; 
Farrell & Shapiro 2008; Budzinski 2010) that enjoy more of a rule character than 
purely case-by-case effects-based decisions – but without preaching the way of rig-
id per se rules. 
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